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NOTES AND COMMENTS
state, and the total miles of their entire run is 500 miles, then a figure
of 100 over 500, or 1 over 5 is the figure for step (2). Applying one-
fifth to $500,000, the state has a valuation of $100,000 which it can tax.
If the tax rate is one dollar on $100 valuation, then the tax to be
assessed against the company results as $1,000 in step (3).
Since 1905, North Carolina has had a statute15 providing for taxing
of canal and steamboat companies in the same manner as provided for
railroads, and so would seem to be in line with this latest decision of
the United States Supreme Court on the point. No cases seem to have
arisen under the North Carolina statute.
Only one North Carolina case dealing with the tax situs of boats
has been found. In Texas Co. v. Elizabeth City' boats were employed
by the Texas Co., a Delaware corporation, to haul oil products on North
Carolina rivers and sounds and into Virginia. Elizabeth City was allowed
by our court to levy an ad valorem tax on the boats on a finding by the
jury in the lower court that for tax purposes the situs of the boats was
in Elizabeth City. That this decision failed to square with prior federal
decisions is pointed out in a prior note in this REVIEW.' 7
BASIL SHERRILL.
Trusts-Chatritable Bequests-Application of Cy Pres Doctrine
The testator, Ackland, willed the bulk of his fortune to his executors
as trustees for the purpose of building and maintaining a memorial art
museum on the campus of Duke University. Duke declined the "bene-
fits, burdens and responsibilities" of the trust and the heirs sued the
trustees, claiming the fortune resulted to them, but the trust was upheld
by the invocation of the cy pres doctrine.' The court ordered the trus-
tees to investigate to see whether the University of North Carolina or
Rollins College or either of them should be selected as the new site.
2
The trustees, after two years of investigation, recommended North
Carolina because of its similarity to Duke in size, financial status, loca-
tion, cultural influende, faculty and curricula. The trial court, however,
selected Rollins as the site because of evidence of its more prominent
art department and Rollins' contention that the University of North
11 N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-371 (1943).1 8210 N. C. 454, 187 S. E. 551 (1936).
17.15 N. C. L. REv. 217 (1937).
1 Noel v. Olds, 138 F. 2d 581 (App. D. C. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 773
(1944). The court found that the testator's primary purpose was to benefit art
education in the South. The fact that a previous will had named Duke, Univer-
sity of North Carolina and Rollins, in that order, tended to show that he had no
special interest in Duke nor any intent to benefit it exclusively.
' See note 1 supra.
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Carolina had been eliminated from consideration by the testator.8' The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed 4 and awarded
the art gallery to North Carolina, holding that even if Rollins had a
better art department, this was irrelevant ;5 that the contention that the
testator had excluded North Carolina from consideration was not well
founded;8 that the trustees' findings should have been binding on the
court;7 and that North Carolina more nearly met the test that "some
great university as nearly similar to Duke in all respects as could be
found" should be chosen.
The cy pres doctrine is "the principle that equity will make specific
a general intent of a settlor, and will, whefi an original specific intent
becomes impossible or impracticable of fulfillment, substitute another
plan of administration which is believed to approach the original scheme
as closely as possible. It is the theory that equity has the power to mould
the charitable trust to meet emergencies." It is an intent-enforcing
doctrine; that is, to apply it the court must find that the testator would
not have intended the trust to fail because the mode of carrying it out
failed. If the testator intended to benefit only a particular institution
or purpose, then the doctrine is not applicable. Having determined that
the settlor had a more general charitable intent, the court must frame
a new scheme for giving effect to it. What should be the basis for this
selection? Scott states that the court in applying the doctrine should
look to what the settlor would have intended at the time he created the
trust, if he had known the particular purpose would fail.9 Rollins
' Rollins contended that it was the original choice but that testator was induced
by President Few of Duke to change his mind and name Duke instead. Rollins
further contended that testator's choice had been narrowed to these two schools,
and that North Carolina had been eliminated from consideration. See note 6 infra.
'Olds v. Rollins College, 173 F. 2d 639 (App. D. C. 1949); University of
North Carolina v. Rollins College, 173 F. 2d 639 (App. D. C. 1949).
"The testator did not compare the art facilities of Duke and Rollins, and
decide that Duke had the better of it. He based his choice on Duke's greater
financial strength, and the fact that its geographical area is better established as
one of extensive educational and cultural advantages. The consideration just men-
tioned make it, in our view, inapposite to compare the art departments of Rollins
and North Carolina. . . ." Id. at 643.
'The previous will of 1936 remained in effect until the one naming Duke was
executed in 1938; hence North Carolina legally remained testator's second choice
until he picked Duke, at which time he excluded North Carolina and Rollins at
the same time. Id. at 644.
' Ordinarily a master is appointed to frame a scheme for the court's considera-
tion, but the trustees were appointed instead. A master's finding of fact is con-
clusive on the court; hence the District Court had to accept the findings of fact
and did so expressly. In holding that these facts did not control the basis of the
selection, the trial court in effect misapplied the cy pres doctrine.
82 BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §431 at 1287 (1935).
'3 Scowr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §399.2 (1939). This language which Rollins
cited does not appear in the author's section on framing a scheme, but on deter-
mining if a general charitable intent existed. Bogert in the section on framing a
scheme suggests looking to what the settlor would have intended but cites no
cases. 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, §441. The Restatement also uses intention
language. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §399, comment c (1935).
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strongly relied on this language, claiming that it was second choice and
testator would have picked it had he known that Duke would reject. On
the other hand, the University of North Carolina argued that in applying
cy pres the court should look to the specification of the settlor as ex-
pressed in the trust instrument and should approximate that choice as
nearly as possible. In practice, the court decisions have followed the
latter view ° and state statutes embodying cy pres have adopted it as
the basis for selection.' No cy pres case has been found involving such
evidence of previous alternative choices as existed here.'2  The courts,
having only the general intent of the settlor and his chosen mode of
effectuating that intent to guide them, have therefore approximated what
the settlor said, rather than presumed what he might have said. It
would seem that the principal case stands for the proposition that this
basis should be adhered to, in the absence of clear evidence that the
object most closely resembling the one stated would have been excluded.
It is well settled that if cy pres is applied, the court frames the
scheme, and although the trustees, attorney general or others may'make
recommendations, the court is not'bound to accept them.'3 The doctrine
is not applicable at all if the trust instrument has special provisions
giving the trustees the power to select substitute schemes. The instant
case states that the court on previous appeal, Noel v. Olds,'4 had con-
strued the will as having such provisions giving the trustees the right
to select a new site,' 5 and that therefore the lower court had no right
to reject their selection. This is clearly an error in the interpretation
of the language of the Noel case.'0 Had the court so construed the
10 Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (1930); Ford v. Thomas, 111
Ga. 493, 36 S. E. 841 (1900) ; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539, 580 (Mass. 1867)
("as near the testator's particular directions as possible . . ."); In re Williams'
Estate, 353 Pa. 638, 643, 46 A. 2d 237, 239 (1946) ; Philadelphia v. Girard's Heirs,
45 Pa. 9, 28 (1863) ("as close approximation to that scheme [settlor's] as reason-
ably practicable . . .") ; First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Racine College, 225 Wis.
34, 272 N. W. 464 (1937).
"'GA. Crv. CODE §4604 (1926); Ford v. Thomas, supra note 10; Wis. STAT.
§231.11 (1945).
12 Cf. Johnson v. Wagner, 219 N. C. 235, 13 S. E. 2d 419 (1941), notes 31-33
infra.
"2 E.g., Ford v. Thomas, 111 Ga. 493, 36 S. E. 841 (1900) (court rejected plan
proposed by trustee) ; 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, §435, §440 at 1335.
' 138 F. 2d 581 (App. D. C. 1943).
1 "We adhere to our decision in Noel v. Olds, where we construed the will as
envisaging the possibility of Duke's refusal, and as giving the trustees the right,
in that event, to select another site." Olds v. Rollins College, 173 F. 2d 639
(App. D. C. 1949).
1" That case relied on the provisions of the will giving the trustees discretion in
administration and also those directing them to carry out the trust according to
the spirit of his intentions, as a basis for finding that the testator had a general
intent, and would not have wanted his trust to fail. That case did state that "here
was prevision of the possibility which actually eventuated and provision for the
course to be followed by his trustees if it did." This language did not recognize
the right of the trustees to select the site, but only the duty to take such steps as
necessary to see that the trust was carried out, including the duty to apply to the
court for cy pres application. Noel v. Olds, 138 F. 2d 581, 588 (App. D. C. 1943).
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will, it could not have held that the case called for the cy pres power,
as that power would have been unnecessary. The instant case should
have decided only that the trial court judge misapplied the cy pres doc-
trine as a matter of law, or that he abused his discretion in not approxi-
mating testator's scheme as nearly as possible.1
7
Although the North Carolina court has stated that the doctrine is
contrary to the public policy of the state, in this case a former governor
of North Carolina' 8 and the attorney general, acting for a board of
trustees headed by the present governor of the state, argued for its
application so that the state university might benefit. It therefore seems
advisable to review the North Carolina cases and statutes and see if the
doctrine is iww unacceptable.
The cases in which cy pres has been discussed by American courts
fall into three broad classes. The first is that where a trust is set up
for indefinite objects, such as "to the poor." In England, cy pres was
applied if the trustee refused to act,19 but if he was willing to make the
selection he could do so and cy pres relief was unnecessary. So in
America, where such trusts have been held valid, the trustees have had
either the express or implied power of selection.20 In those states hold-
ing such trusts as invalid because too vague for enforcement, it has
been said that cy pres would not be applied to make the general intent
specific and thus save the trust.21 North Carolina now has a statute
validating such trusts and giving the trustees the power to select the
objects.
22
"7 A cy pres case may be appealed on the grounds of the lower court's abuse
of discretion in applying the doctrine. Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., 230 N. Y.
462, 473, 130 N. E. 613, 616 (1921).
18 The late 0. Max Gardner was the instigator of the University's application
to intervene, and his law firm handled the case to its conclusion without charge to
the University.
"92 BoGEr, op. cit. supra note 8, §432.
20 3 ScoTr, op. cit. supra note 9, §396. If the trust instrument doesn't expressly
state the trustees should select the objects, apparently they have the right to do
so as a part of the administration of the trust. Cy pres is not mentioned in such
cases. See State v. Gerard, 37 N. C. 210 (1842) (for the poor of B county);
State v. McGowen, 37 N. C. 9 (1841) (for the establishment of schools for the
poor of X county) ; Whitsett v. Clapp, 200 N. C. 647, 158 S. E. 183 (1931) (for
"keeping up preaching in weak churches").
212 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1304. Where a trust is held void for in-
definiteness, the court will not apply cy pres to save it. Holland v. Peck, 37 N. C.
255 (1842) ; Bridges v. Pleasants, 39 N. C. 26 (1845) ; Taylor v. American Bible
Society, 42 N. C. 201 (1851); Thomas v. Clay, 187 N. C. 778, 122 S. E. 852
(1924). The North Carolina courts have seemed to think this situation involved
prerogative power, rather than the judicial. Holland v. Peck, supra at 260; see
Griffin v. Graham, 8 N. C. 96, 134 (1820). But the prerogative power in England
was exercised only where the object was illegal, or there was a direct gift for
charity generally without a trust created. 3 Scorr, loc. cit. supra note 9. In Hol-
land v. Peck, supra, a trust was set up. For an explanation of the judicial con-
fusion in America, see Comment, A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L. J. 303
(1939) ; 32 GEo. L. J. 427 (1944).2' "No gift, grant, bequest or devise whether in trust or otherwise, to religious,
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In the second class of cases the objects of the trust are definite, as
in the instant case the trust is for an art museum at a particular site.
The doctrine is invoked when it becomes impossible to carry out the
trust exactly as stated-the site becomes unavailable, the purpose be-
comes impossible or the beneficiaries no longer exist. The great majority
of states will apply cy pres in such cases and execute the trust "as near
as may be."2 3 Under this general class, four types of cases have arisen
in North Carolina. (1) Thus where there was a surplus of funds after
the trust was carried out, the court refused to apply the surplus cy pres
to similar objects. 24  (2) Where the purpose of the trust became impos-
sible the court refused to save it by applying cy pres.2 5 In the next two
types North Carolina actually applied cy pres, at the same time repeating
the rejection of the doctrine. (3) Where there was a deficit of funds
making impossible the exact execution of the trust, the court neverthe-
less upheld the trust as near as possible, saying it was merely applying
the fund to the very purpose named as far as it would go.26 Regardless
of the court's statement that this type case did not call for cy pres, it is
generally accepted that this situation is one application of the doctrine.
27
(4) The last case in this class involved a sale of the trust property.
Ordinarily, a court of equity can order such a sale as incident to juris-
diction over the administration of the charitable trust. It is said that
this does not involve cy pres power as long as the specific purpose of
the trust remains unchanged ;28 but the line between the two theories is
not well defined. A typical case is one in which a residence is devised
educational, charitable, or benevolent uses . . . shall be invalid by reason of any
indefiniteness or uncertainty of the objects or beneficiaries of such trust, or be-
cause said instrument confers upon the trustee or trustees discretionary powers
in the selection and designation of the objects .... " N. C. GEN. STAT. §36-21
(1943). N. C. GEN. STAT. §36-23.1 (1947 Cum. Supp.) broadens the scope of the
1925 statute. See 25 N. C. L. REv. 476 (1947) to the effect that the later statute
was passed to overrule Woodcock v. Wachovia Bank, 214 N. C. 224, 199 S. E.
20 (1938). That case held that the 1925 act did not validate a trust in which
trustees were to pay to any corporation which would best promote the cause of
preventing cruelty to animals, because it left control not only in the trustees, but
in the trustees' donee.
" 2 BoGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, §433.
" Trustees of Davidson College v. Chambers, 56 N. C. 253 (1857).
" cAuley v. Wilson, 16 N. C. 276 (1828) ; see 1 N. C. L. REv. 41 (1922).
' Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Ogburn, 181 N. C. 324, 107 S. E. 238 (1921);
Paine v. Forney, 128 N. C. 237, 38 S. E. 885 (1901); University of North Car-
olina v. Gatling, 81 N. C. 508 (1879).
' 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, §438; Jones' Unknown Heirs v. Dorchester,
224 S. W. 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
"' 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, §392; 3 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 9, §381; 6
ALA. LAW. 17 (1945). This principle should apply when a mortgage is allowed.
or a sale of property incidental to the purposes of the trust. Where the purpose
of the trust is closely connected with the use of some specific piece of property,
the sale does defeat the specific intent of the settlor but the proceeds are applied
cy pres. See ZOLLMANN, THE AmERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES §161 (1924), and
note 29 infra.
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to be used as a parsonage. The property is in disrepair; the court
orders a sale, the proceeds to be used to build another parsonage. Many
courts say this is applying cy pres because the specific intent (using the
original residence as the, parsonage) is not feasible, but the general
intent is carried out.29 North Carolina will order a sale, saying that
this does not call for cy pres power because the purpose of the trust is
not changed.30 Tf these North Carolina, cases are on the borderline, then
Johnson v. Wagner3l is undoubtedly a cy pres case, as the sale in that
case necessarily involved a change in the purpose of the trust. The
testator devised property to individual trustees to be used by the Baptist
Church for an assembly ground, but the church refused the benefits.
The court allowed a sale and authorized the trustees to use the proceeds
for other religious purposes. 32 Here the funds were not applied to
the original purpose of an assembly ground, but were applied in accord-
ance with the testator's general charitable intention. The court, while
not specifically- mentioning cy pres, said, "The general intent of the
testator must prevail over the particular mode prescribed," citing Zoll-
mann on Charities from the chapter on cy pres 133
The third class is that in which no trust is created; for example, a
2 In re Emlen's Estate, 57 Pa. D. &' C. 404 (1946) (T willed residence as
convalescent home for girls; court allowed sale, applied cy pres, proceeds to be
used for convalescing. girls). In two Rhode Island cases on practically identical
facts, one coUrt applied cy pres, the other expressly said it was not applying it.
Town of South Kingstown v. Wakefield Trust, 48 R. I. 27, 134 A. 815 (1926) ;
City of Newport v. Sisson, 51 R. I. 481, 155 A. 576 (1931). The former is cited
in the text of Scott as authority that this is not' cy pres;j it would seem that the
latter case at least impliedly overrules it. See 3 Scorr, op. cit. supra note 9, at
2046. Weeden Home v. Weeden's Heirs, 73 R. I. 22, 53 A. 2d 476 (1947) (cy
pres applicable). And the sale of realty held in trust is called the doctrine of
approximation in Alabama, and incorporated into statute. ALA. CODE ANN., tit. 58,
§57 (1940); Heustess v. Huntington College, 242 Ala. 272, 5 So. 2d 777 (1942)
see Thurlow v. Berry, 247 Ala. 631, 636, 25 So. 2d 726, 730 (1946) ("The dis-
tinction between that [approximation] and cy pres is sometimes shadowy.").
ZOLLMANN, loc. cit. supra note 28 ("The sale of property donated to charitable
purposes affords one of the best illustrations of the doctrine .... The incidental
purpose of the donor that the particular real estate given by him be used as the
seat of the charity will be disregarded in order to carry out his primary purpose.
The proceeds realized must, of course, be reinvested in similar property for the
same uses and trusts, or at least must be used for the same purposes.") ; 2 BOGERT,
op cit. supra note 8, §437 at 1316.
3' Holton v. Elliott, 193 N. C. 708, 138 S. E. 3 (1927) ; Ex parte Wilds, 182
N. C. 705, 110 S. E. 57 (1921); Church v. Ange, 161 N. C. 314, 77 S. E. 239
(1913) ; accord, Page v. Covington, 187 N. C. 621, 122 S. E. 481 (1924).
219 N. C. 235, 13 S. E. 2d 419 (1941).
"A portion of the'residuary fund was to be used by the trustees for the
assembly ground or "For such other religious purposes as said Board of Trustees
may determine as worthy." Court found the general intent was to donate to
charity under the control of the religious organizations named. This case seems
to have gone farther than the cases it cites for authority. E.g., Church v. Ange,
161 N. C. 314, 77 S. E. 239 (1913) ; Holton v. Elliott, 193 N. C. 708, 138 S. E. 3
(1927).
3s219 N. C. 235, 239, 13 S. E. 2d 419, 422 (1941) citing ZOLLMANN, Op. Cit.
supra note 28, §137.
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testator bequeaths the residue of his estate directly "for charity" without
naming a trustee. In England the king exercised prerogative cy pres
power and picked a charity without regard to the testator's intent.
3 4
The abuses of this power resulted in the unpopularity of the judicial
cy pres doctrine in the early American decisions. 35 The American courts
now will not let the trust fail, but will appoint a trustee and allow him
to select the objects,3 6 and the North Carolina statute on charitable
trusts seems broad enough to allow this.3 7  If the testator makes a direct
bequest to a charitable organization which for some reason cannot take,
the courts will imply a trust for the corporate purposes38 and appoint
a new trustee. Some say they are applying cy pres;39 others say they
are proceeding on the theory that equity will not allow a trust to fail
for want of a trustee.40  North Carolina has upheld such a gift by
appointing a new trustee on the latter theory.41
On analysis it may be seen that North Carolina, while refusing to
apply cy pres, has used various other methods to accomplish the same
result as is accomplished by that doctrine in other states. The decisions
have taken care to repeat such refusal, even in cases not concerned with
the doctrine.42  In an early cy pres case, Holland v. Peck, the North
Carolina court assigned two reasons for this state's refusal to apply the
"In England two types of cy pres existed, and later both were exercised by the
chancellor: one, the prerogative, was exercised for the king; the other, judicial,
was an equitable doctrine. The American courts have felt they could exercise
only the judicial power; if a case would have called for the prerogative in Eng-
land, the American courts would not apply the doctrine. These distinctions are
disappearing. See notes 21 supra and 49 .fra.
"See Klumpert v. Vrieland, 142 Iowa 434, 437-8, 121 N. W. 34, 35 (1909);
3 ScoTn, op. cit. supra note 9, §399.1..
" Klumpert v. Vrieland, supra note 35; Jordan's Estate, 329 Pa. 427, 197 At.
150 (1938); see RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §397, comment f (1935).
.1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §36-21 (1943); N. C. GEN. STAT. §36-23.1 (1947 Cum.
Supp.).
"Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., 230 -N. Y. 462, 130 N. E. 613 (1921).
" Osgood v. Rogers, 186 Mass. 238, 71 N. E. 306 (1904) (court implied trust
and then applied cy pres to pick new trustee) ; Powers v. Home for Aged Women,
58 R. I. 323, 192 Atl. 770 (1937).
40 Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., 230 N. Y. 462, 130 N. E. 613 (1921) ; In re
Clendenin's Estate, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 875 (Surr. Ct. 1939) ; In re Shand's Estate, 275
Pa. 77, 118 AtI. 623 (1922) ; In re Gilchrist's Estate, 50 Wy. 153, 58 P. 2d 431
(1936).
" Keith v. Scales, 124 N. C. 497, 32 S. E. 809 (1899) ; see Holland v. Peck, 37
N. C. 255, 258 (1842) (bequest to a church is charitable trust, and where trustee
cannot take, court will supply one; trust not upheld because purposes indefinite) ;
Lassiter v. Jones, 215 N. C. 298, 1 S. E. 2d 845 (1939) (to a lodge for use of an
Academy; lodge no longer existed, court appointed new trustee; ignored fact that
beneficiary had also ceased to exist).
" Lemmond v. Peoples, 41 N. C. 137 (1848) (private trust for certain slaves);
Faribault v. Taylor, 58 N. C. 219 (1859) (if G wants to remain with mother,
house should be enlarged-too indefinite to be a trust, and won't apply cy pres
to make it definite) ; Board of Education v. Wilson, 215 N. C. 216, 1 S. E. 2d 544
(1939) (town attempts to collect taxes to be refunded for school purposes; town
has no school and won't be allowed to use for something else, as this would
be cy pres).
1949]
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doctrine: (1) it is not the law in any of the other states; (2) to exercise
it would be to make a new will for the testator. 43 Cy pres is now
recognized in all but five states, 44 and in some of these, as in North
Carolina, the words and actions have not been consistent.45 Moreover,
the application of the doctrine no more makes a will for the testator
than where he wills his property outright to one charitable organization
and the court awards it to a similar organization. 40 The only justifiable
reason left for failure to adopt the doctrine is the precedent of the
earlier decisions, and the policy behind these has changed.
47
It would now be desirable for North Carolina to adopt cy pres by
incorporating the doctrine into a statute48 to cover any case in which it




Holland v. Peck, 37 N. C. 255, 261-62 (1842).
"Bogert listed seven stated in 1935, 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, §433.
Since then four of these have adopted the doctrine: Alabama, ALA. CODE ANN., tit.
47, §145 (1940); District of Columbia, Noel v. Olds, 138 F. 2d 581 (App. D. C.
1943); Kentucky, Citizens Fidelity Bank v. Berheim Foundation, 305 Ky. 802,
205 S. W. 2d 1003 (1947); Delaware, Delaware Trust Co. v. Graham, -
Dela. - , 61 A. 2d 113 (1948). Also, Virginia incorporated the doctrine into
statute. VA. CoDE ANN. §587-a (Cum. Supp. 1946). This left North Carolina,
South Carolina and Tennessee. Arizona by dictum in In re Hayward's Estate, 65
Ariz. 228, 235, 178 P. 2d 547, 551 (1947) repudiated the doctrine. Mississippi
has the doctrine of approximation. National Bank of Greece v. Savarika, 167
Miss. 571, 148 So. 649 (1933).
" The Tennessee situation is much like the North Carolina law. Johnson v.
Johnson, 92 Tenn. 559, 23 S. W. 114 (1893) (if void for indefiniteness, cy pres
won't save) ; Milligan v. Greeneville College, 156 Tenn. 495, 2 S. W. 2d 90 (1928)
(if gift to charitable organization, treats as a trust) ; King College v. Anderson,
148 Tenn. 328, 255 S. W. 374 (1923) (changed site for college by sale-in effect
applied cy pres by "varying details of administration") ; Garner v. Home Bank &
Trust Co., 171 Tenn. 652, 107 S. W. 2d 223 (1937) (bequest to college lapsed;
court found no general intent; cy pres not mentioned) ; see 16 TENN. L. REv. 38
(1939). South Carolina has the "doctrine of liberal construction." This amounted
to cy pres in Mars v. Gilbert, 93 S. C. 455, 77 S. E. 131 (1913). See 2 BOGERT,
op. cit. supra note 8, §433. South Carolina still talks as if cy pres is prerogative;
see Porcher v. Cappelmann, 187 S. C. 491, 198 S. E. 8 (1938) ; City of Columbia
v. Monteith, 139 S. C. 262, 137 S. E. 727 (1927).
"See note 41 supra.
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of North Carolina that
gifts, transfers, grants, bequests and devises for religious, educational, charitable
or benevolent uses or purposes .. .are and shall be valid, notwithstanding the
fact that any such gift . . . shall be in general terms, and this section shall be
construed liberally to effect the policy herein declared. . . ." N. C. GEN. STAT.
§36-23.1 (1947 Cum. Supp.). Thus the state has reversed its policy toward chari-
ties since McAuley v. Wilsm was decided in 1828.
"E.g., GA. Civ. CoDE §4604 (1926); MINN. (L. 1927, c. 180); Wis STAT.
§231.11 (1945). For other statutes see 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, §433 n. 40
and 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra, §433 n. 40 (1948 Cum. Supp.).
4 'See 32 Gio. L. J. 425 at 432 criticizing the Noel case for distinguishing
judicial and prerogative cy pres, as these distinctions are disappearing in practice
and should in courts' language; Comment, A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE
L J. 303 at 308 (1939).
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